The Epic of Kore is one of the decisive battles that the Kurdistan Peshmerga recorded against the Iraqi Army from April 7-11, 1991, after the Iraqi Army was defeated in the spring of 1991 against the forces of the Kurdistan Peshmerga of the Kurdistan Front and the wave of mass protests in South Kurdistan, and all the cities and towns of South Kurdistan were liberated. The regime's army was given the green light by the coalition forces in a short time, and on March 27, 1991, it fought against the Peshmerga from Kirkuk and brought many towns and cities under its control until it reached the Kore Valley. In this difficult area, the Peshmerga Forces established a strong defensive line to prevent the advance of the Iraqi Army. With two major infantry attacks supported by tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and combat helicopters, it attacked the town of Kore, but it was severely defeated.

Developments of the Epic of Kore event

After the eight-year war between Iraq and Iran, the Ba'ath regime presented itself as a global power; its arrogance and pride had crossed the boundaries of humanity, violating human rights, violating the lives of civilians, and crossing international borders with the aim of occupation through military operations under the pretext that it possessed a large military force and was the fifth largest army in the world in terms of numbers and weapons (Gherdî, 2021, 305). This was a significant reason for the Ba'ath Regime's attack on Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and it controlled the country within 24 hours. All of this led to international opposition against the regime and the imposition of United Nations Resolution 687, then it found itself in an economic crisis and the outbreak of the Gulf War (Charles Tripp, 2013, 336). The defeat of the Iraqi Army against the coalition forces and the weakness and lack of confidence of the Ba'ath leaders towards the people of Iraq accelerated the events and paved the way for the revolution and uprising of the Iraqi people, and primarily the Kurdish people, in such a way that they did not hesitate to remove the party and military institutions in the south and north of the country (Mohammed Aziz, 2024, 226), and as a result, in the spring of 1991, the masses of the people rose up against the army, armed forces, and security forces of the Ba'ath regime, and a nationwide uprising occurred (Omer Osman, 2008, 155). The 1991 uprising in South Kurdistan was a historical stage in the life of the Kurdish people (Barzani, 2020, 43).

On March 5, 1991, for the first time, the fire of the uprising set fire to the party and military institutions of the Ba'ath regime, and first in the city of Ranya and then in other cities and towns of South Kurdistan, they were cleared of the Ba'athists one after another, and the Ba'athists were expelled. On March 21, 1991, Kirkuk also fell into the hands of the revolutionary forces and the uprising masses (Heme Elî, 2016, 186-191). The rapid victories confirmed that the uprising was the greatest Kurdish revolution in the history of the Kurdistan liberation movement, because for the first time, the Kurds were able to liberate the entire South Kurdistan, including Kirkuk, from the hands of the Iraqi regime (Qadir, 2022, 62).

 

The military campaign of the Iraqi Army to re-occupy Kurdistan

The defeated army of the Gulf War, after losing all the cities and towns of Kurdistan, was looking for an opportunity to launch a counter-attack against Kurdistan and regain the liberated cities and towns. Although the Kurdish forces, which had formed a battle front within the framework of the Kurdistan Front, held a meeting on March 27, 1991, to attack the Khalid military base in Kirkuk, which was still under the control of the Iraqi Army, the attack was not carried out due to the negligence of one side of the Kurdistan Front. On the contrary, the Iraqi Army stood against the Peshmerga Forces with tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and warplanes (Heme Elî, 2016, 192). On March 28, 1991, under the supervision and planning of Ezzat al-Douri and Ali Hassan al-Majid, who had been appointed by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to occupy Kurdistan, the regime's first attack on the Peshmerga in Kirkuk began (Qadir, 2022, 63). In this conflict, the Peshmerga forces suffered heavy blows, and a large number of Peshmerga and uprising masses were martyred and wounded at the Khalid Training base. As a result, the army was able to take Kirkuk and began moving to take Erbil and Sulaymaniyah (Îsmaîl, 2019, 257).

The Iraqi Army attacked Kurdistan from Kirkuk with a comprehensive plan and with great military capabilities of warplanes, Katyushas, long-range artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles. Although the Peshmerga forces attacked them several times, it did not have much effect on stopping the Iraqi Army's attack. On one hand, due to the fragmentation of political forces and the inexperience of some Peshmerga in front-line warfare, and on the other hand, the inequality in terms of power, weapons, and logistical capabilities, they were forced to retreat (Omer Osman, 2008, 166). The Iraqi Army continued its advance with the highest morale until it occupied most of the liberated areas. Perhaps that was not the cause of the Peshmerga's defeat as it was said; perhaps there were other reasons, such as the unusual distribution of the Peshmerga within the defensive positions and the fact that the Peshmerga of all parties did not fight, which broadened the ground for the Iraqi Army's advances.

It is worth noting that the advances of the Iraqi Army caused great fear and anxiety in the hearts of the city residents, because the citizens were aware of the oppression of the Ba'ath regime in the past, and there was a fear that it would take a hostile stance and react against the uprising masses. Therefore, most of the city residents migrated to the border areas, and thus the million-person exodus began (Qadir, 2022, 63). Many of those refugees became refugees in both Iran and Turkey, which opened their borders to the refugees (Zêbarî, 2015, 517).

The attack of the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga defense line

When the Iraqi Ba'ath regime's army succeeded in suppressing the uprising in southern Iraq, it reorganized itself to re-occupy Kurdistan and suppress the Kurdish people's uprising. It first captured Kirkuk and then advanced to occupy Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The Peshmerga Forces at that time consisted of the forces of the Kurdistan Front parties; they strengthened their efforts to block the Iraqi Army's attack at the village of Sherawa near the town of Pirde (Seyidkake, 1997, 252), but they could not stop the attack, so they headed to Qoshtepe south of Erbil. In the Qoshtepe plain, the Iraqi Army blindly bombarded the people fleeing from the plain with tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and helicopters; not long after, it took control of Qoshtepe. The Peshmerga Forces established a new battlefront against them to stop their advances and confronted them at night, but these efforts were fruitless and after a while they retreated, until the Iraqi Army's advance reached the city of Erbil and on March 31 they brought the city completely under their control (Omer Osman, 2008, 167).

Before the Iraqi Army entered the city of Erbil, the Kurdistan Front forces met to discuss the war situation and stop the Iraqi Army's advance. In the meeting, the parties had different views on how to confront the army's attack; some thought they could not fight and confront the regime, but one side, for the sake of bargaining, thought they could fight the army and decided to fight. According to reports, a military official of one of the parties also believed that they could not defend inside Erbil, but together with the leader of that party who said they would fight, they visited the defense line of the Kirkuk-Dibege road where they had stationed forces, but they saw that not a single Peshmerga remained in their place and they had left the battlefield (Seyidkake, 1997, 252-253).

According to one account, the reason for the recapture of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah by the Iraqi Regime is that the Kurdistan Front's Peshmerga forces were not sufficient to withstand the regime's large forces, and the popular forces were not well organized, but participated in a chaotic manner. While the Iraqi Army was moving from Kirkuk towards Sulaymaniyah and Erbil, its advances were rapid in the face of the weak defense of the Peshmerga; most of the people began to migrate and took their families and children towards the border of Iran and Turkey, thus the million-person exodus began (Ismail, 2019, 257).

After the Iraqi Army completely controlled Erbil, it continued its attempt to occupy all the cities and towns of Kurdistan. To do this, the 28th Division, commanded by Amid Rukan Hamad Hamo, was tasked with controlling the Pirman resort. On April 5, 1991, that force began to move. The Peshmerga Forces set up another defense line near Mala Omar to stop the army's advance, but the low number of Peshmerga forces, the fragmentation of the Peshmerga forces, and the failure of some Peshmerga forces to obey the orders of their leaders were the reasons why they retreated to Xanzad at the foot of the Pirman resort. The army's advances were increasing and they were approaching Pirman; although the Barzani force had set up positions in Bestore and tried to stop the army there, due to the inequality of forces, weapons, and ammunition, they could not stop their advances (Qadir, 2022, 71).

Efforts by the Kurdistan Front leadership continued to stop the Iraqi Army's advance to prevent further progress by the Iraqi Army; for this, a meeting of the military leaders of the Kurdistan Front parties was held in Pirman to establish a strong defense line in Pirman. In the meeting, it was decided to divide the battlefront into two fronts on the main road between Erbil and Shaqlawa; the first front below Sere-Rash was assigned to the forces of the Patriotic Union and the Socialist Party, and the second front, Sere Avreje and the village of Ziyaret, was handed over to the forces of the Democratic Party and the Communist Party. The Peshmerga forces stayed in these areas for several days, but the army's advances towards Pirman continued until they reached the Pirman positions; the Peshmerga's defense was not strong enough to stop the advance, the Peshmerga's defense line there also broke and they headed to Kore.

The Iraqi Army's advance continued and it captured region by region; the situation in Kurdistan was getting worse and the people were becoming more hopeless and fleeing in masses. The Iraqi Army was approaching the occupation of the whole of Kurdistan, the Peshmerga's defense was very weak, the morale and hope of the people had collapsed, because the parties did not defend in an organized manner, the only force that responded to the Iraqi Army's attack was the force that was with Masoud Barzani and had blocked the helicopters with machine guns so that they would not cause harm to the Peshmerga and the people. The soldiers were getting closer to Pirman and on April 6, 1991, a small force of Peshmerga led by Dr. Said Barzani, Halit Dolameri, and several other Peshmerga units resisted the Iraqi Army, but they could not stop them and the town fell into the hands of the army units. The Peshmerga forces retreated to the village of Hujran near the Kore Valley, and this is interpreted as a military strategy because the geographical location of the Kore Valley was much better for the small Peshmerga forces to establish a defense line against the large Iraqi army. The Peshmerga forces were divided into two strategic locations; the heights of the town of Kore in the west were where the KDP forces were stationed, the eastern front was assigned to the PUK forces; each of Hamid Efendi from the KDP and Kosrat Rasul from the PUK led the battle (Qadir, 2022, 72-75).

The army's advances towards Kore

The Iraqi Army had planned to re-occupy all the cities and towns of Kurdistan, with the aim of having the Kurdish uprising meet the same fate as the uprising in southern Iraq, which it had suppressed. However, the Battle of Kore became a bright and historical point in the history of the Kurdish liberation movement. It is clear that this area, due to its difficult geographical location, is surrounded by rugged mountain ranges to the east and west, and from both sides, they overlook a valley through which the main Erbil-Shaqlawa road passes. The Peshmerga Forces decided to establish a strong defense against the advance of the Iraqi Army to block the regime's forces. Naturally, after controlling the Pirmam resort on April 7, 1991, the Iraqi Army advanced toward the town of Kore with a large force of advanced infantry consisting of tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles (Qadir, 2022, 79).

• First attack:

On April 7, 1991, the Iraqi Army attacked the town of Kore from the town of Pirmam with tanks and armored vehicles. They advanced from Pirmam toward Kore without encountering any Peshmerga resistance. When they reached Kore, a force of Peshmerga from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), under the command of Dr. Saeed Barzani and Halid Dolameri, on the heights opposite the Kore Valley, by the order of Hamid Efendi, the military commander of the battle front, with a small force and limited logistical capabilities, confronted the attack and a fierce battle began. The Peshmerga Forces hit their targets and became a strong and powerful fortress, defeating the army's advances in the valley and managing to repel the attack (Qadir, 2022, 79). In this battle, the Peshmerga inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi Army; 4 of their tanks, armored vehicles, and a number of military vehicles were destroyed (Seyidkake, 1997, 255).

With the destruction of the tanks and armored vehicles that the Peshmerga targeted with RPG weapons from the heights, a hand-to-hand battle also began in the lower part. The Peshmerga attacked the tanks, armored vehicles, and destroyed vehicles. In this fierce battle, the Peshmerga escaped without losses, but more than 14 soldiers of the Iraqi Army were killed, whose bodies remained on the battlefield, and a number of others were taken prisoner.

In this battle, the Peshmerga achieved a great victory, and after these defeats, the commander of the Iraqi Army's military division insisted on advancing and continuing the attack. However, the Peshmerga's defense was very strong and far beyond the expectations of the army commanders. When the division commander realized that the army could no longer advance, he was forced to order a retreat to the Pirmam resort, in order to have a stronger plan and another more powerful attack on the Kore Valley, so that they could break the Peshmerga's defensive line and reach Shaqlawa (Qadir, 2022, 80).

When the Peshmerga forces recorded a great victory against the Iraqi Army, information reached the Peshmerga that the Iraqi Army was planning to attack the Kore Valley positions again. The Kurdistan leadership, especially Masoud Barzani the President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), who was also leading the Kurdistan Front, increased all his efforts to reorganize the battlefield or the defense line. For this, he requested the leadership of the Kurdistan Front parties to return their forces to the battlefield and distribute them within the defense lines, to prevent the regime's advance so that it would no longer progress and to set a border to its arrogance. During this time, several other Peshmerga forces of the parties returned to the battle fronts.

On April 9, 1991, upon the suggestion of Peshmerga leader Hassan Najjar, who was planning a counter-attack to show the other side the strength and capability of the Peshmerga—that they could attack, not just defend—and also to give courage and morale to the Peshmerga that the enemy's strength was not so great that the Peshmerga could not defeat it.

To carry out this attack, Hassan Najjar divided his forces into three groups:

The first group was a support force consisting of Seyid Fakhir, Khalid Anwar, and Seyid Iskandar, and its task was to shell the Iraqi Army's bases and units before the attack.

The second group, commanded by Zeynel Ahmed, was tasked with attacking the strategic Rabayan on the right side of the army.

The third group was led by Hassan Najjar himself, and the plan was implemented as it had been planned.

In the attack, a 106 mm cannon was used, which played an important role in weakening the Iraqi Army soldiers, as it heavily shelled the army's bases and centers. The Peshmerga's attack step reached the borders of the Iraqi Army, and the operation was very successful. The goal of this attack was not to recover lost territories but was more of a battle tactic to show the strength and capabilities of the Peshmerga. In this attack, the Iraqi Army suffered heavy blows, and the Peshmerga escaped without damage (Qadir, 2022, 92-93).

• Second attack:

The Iraqi Army, to implement its plan of breaking the Peshmerga's defensive line in the valley and the heights of the town of Kore, for the second time on 11.04.1991, all brigade officers gathered and tried their luck and launched a major attack on the Peshmerga positions. The Kurdistan Front forces, having received information about the attack through a Kurdish army officer, the high-ranking officials of the party leadership, led by Masoud Barzani met in the village of Hujran near the Kore Valley and reorganized the battle front and divided the positions among the party forces:

• The eastern front of the Kore Valley was entrusted to the forces of the Patriotic Union, the Toilers Party, and the People's Party.

• The western front of the Kore Valley was entrusted to the forces of the Democratic Party, the Communist Party, the Islamic Movement, the Socialist Party, and Hezbollah (Seyidkake, 1997, 256).

According to the plan of the second attack on the Peshmerga positions, on 11.04.1991 at 04:45 in the morning, the army started with heavy shelling on the Peshmerga positions, then with a large force supported by tanks and armored vehicles they approached the Peshmerga positions, at the beginning, as it had been planned, the Peshmerga hid until the army was completely close, in a way they had shocked the officers and soldiers that there is no defense, but when the tanks and armored vehicles approached the foot of the mountain, suddenly with all the weapons they had in their hands, they attacked them at once and fired at them, the Iraqi army was confused, the tanks, armored vehicles and the forward forces were completely defeated, the soldiers of the 412th and 78th Brigades fled in a hurry and left their dead on the battlefield next to the road (Qadir, 2022, 86-87).

At the beginning, the army's attack on the heights of the western front of the Valley was to some extent successful and after the martyrdom and wounding of a number of Peshmerga of the Barzan Force, several places fell into the hands of the regime forces, but most of the Peshmerga on the front line of the battle did not leave their positions and fought and were a good hope for a counter-attack and the return of the lost land, then other forces for support from all parties by the order of Masoud Barzani the leader of the Kurdistan Front arrived at the battlefield and climbed the Ermewan heights and other places and in a short time they were able to return those places that had fallen into the hands of the army. A group of Peshmerga led by Hassan Najjar who had carried 106 mm cannons, mortars, BKC and snipers, played an effective role in defeating the army ranks and tanks and armored vehicles (Omer Osman, 2008, 171-172).

The weight of the attack was mainly on the western side of the Kore Valley and on the eastern side there was not much attack except for a hill near the main road which initially fell into the hands of the army, but then it was attacked again and the regime forces were expelled (Seyidkake, 1997, 257).

It is worth mentioning that in this attack the Peshmerga recorded a great and historical victory, disappointed the Iraqi regime from the dream it wanted to realize and it could not reach its goal and control the Peshmerga defense line and reach other areas. Because of the noise, fire and weapons, the soldiers and officers were exhausted, instead, fleeing and hiding by the river bank was more important for them, therefore, they did not succeed and the Iraqi army was completely disappointed from the victory and reaching the areas they had planned to occupy and were forced to retreat and suffered heavy blows from the killing and wounding of their soldiers. Also, a number of tanks, armored vehicles and heavy weapons fell into the hands of the Peshmerga. After the government was sure that it could no longer advance its forces to occupy other parts of Kurdistan, it announced a ceasefire and started negotiations for the solution of the Kurdish problem (Omar Osman, 2008, 172).

Reasons for the defeat of the Iraqi army in the Kore battle

Although the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army were not equal in terms of power, weapons and military capabilities to a large extent, a small number of Peshmerga forces were able to stand against the Iraqi army and defeat two of their major attacks, it is clear that the success of the Peshmerga or vice versa, the defeat of the army in these two attacks is due to several reasons such as:

  1. Role of the leader: The leader is the main pillar of the force, especially in war, with courage, skill and knowledge he makes decisions and places duties and responsibilities on the shoulders of his subordinates who can carry them well in any condition and there must be trust between them. The role of Masoud Barzani as the leader of the Kurdistan Front in the Kore battle who was closely aware of the battle front, was very important because he had a plan for every advance (Qadir, 2022, 102) and was in constant contact with the commanders of the political parties (Dolemeri, 2021, 298). Also, for strengthening the defense line and preventing the army's advance, he had an unprecedented role in gathering the Peshmerga forces of the Kurdistan Front parties and distributing them in the battle positions, also his presence and direct supervision of the battle had a great impact on the morale of the Peshmerga, especially in a situation where he announced "Either the enemy must return to Kurdistan over our bodies or we will not allow ourselves to be oppressed again" (Qadir, 2022, 102).
  2. The geographical location of each region plays an important role in armed conflict. Military leaders and armed forces who know about war planning always consider the geographical location important for the success of the war plan and confrontation. The Kore Valley is a narrow road because it is surrounded by difficult mountains from all sides, it was a strong factor in the Peshmerga's success in the two major attacks of the army which were with the support of tanks, cannons, armored vehicles and a great logistical capability, against a small force of Peshmerga and few weapons and ammunition, but they had a rich experience of action and confrontation in the mountains, valleys and difficult hills which have always been the back of the Peshmerga, on the other hand, it was difficult for the Iraqi army to succeed against the Peshmerga in a difficult mountainous area (Qadir, 2022, 103).
  3. The high morale of the Peshmerga and the sense of national and patriotic responsibility, sacrifice and sacrificing their lives for the protection of the land and the country, was another strong factor for the success of the Peshmerga that with a small minority, in two major attacks they were able to defeat a large army, at the same time to teach him a lesson that it is very difficult to try himself in that way again, instead, he should resort to negotiations and peaceful solutions to solve the problems (Omar Osman, 2008, 172).
Results and consequences of the Kore Epic:
  • Reorganizing and strengthening the defense line which was the main factor of the success of the Peshmerga forces in confronting the two large-scale attacks of the Iraqi army which had started with great military power and capability from Kirkuk until it reached the Kore Valley, but the Iraqi army was so defeated that it never dared to attack the Peshmerga positions again (Seyidkake, 1997, 256).
  • The failure of the Iraqi army to realize its dream of occupying all other parts of Kurdistan and suppressing the Kurdistan uprising like the uprising in southern Iraq (Omer Osman, 2008, 173).
  • Acceptance of peaceful and diplomatic solutions such as dialogue and negotiations with the parties of the Kurdistan Front to find a solution to the problems, in which delegations of political parties visited Baghdad several times and held meetings with Ba'ath leaders (Omer Osman, 2008, 173). However, due to the arrogance of the Iraqi regime leaders and their distance from a fundamental solution, the efforts did not succeed and the negotiations did not yield any positive results (Qader, 2022, 123).
  • The issuance of United Nations Resolution 688 on condemning the Iraqi regime for the oppression and genocide against civilians in Iraq, especially Kurdish citizens, providing a safe haven above the 36th parallel, and providing urgent aid to the areas, through the efforts and proposals of the French government in the Security Council (Mam Jalal, 2017, 190).
  • When the 36th parallel was designated as a border line against the regime's threats to Kurdistan, Baghdad withdrew its administrative institutions from Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, Duhok, and Garmian on November 24, 1991, which created an administrative vacuum for citizens to manage their affairs (Qader, 2022, 131). To fill this vacuum and solve this problem, the Kurdistan Front decided to hold elections for the Kurdistan Parliament, which were held in a calm and free atmosphere on May 19, 1992, and subsequently the Kurdistan Regional Government was formed (Barzani, 2020, 45).
  • The Kurdistan Region has become a sanctuary for many victims, fighters, and freedom seekers of Iraq and the opposition forces that are governing the country today (Barzani, 2020, 45).
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