One of the important battles on the border of the Erbil Brigade that had a direct impact on changing the course of events and the revolution of Southern Kurdistan was the Battle of Handren. Clearly, the government's strategic goals for occupying Mount Handren were the presence of the center of the Kurdish revolution's leadership and the headquarters and decision-making base of Barzani in the Balakayati region. The battle of Mount Handren was a balance and scale of power between the army of the Kurdistan revolution and the Iraqi Army. The capture and expulsion of the Peshmerga forces from the mountain would have posed a direct threat to the headquarters of Barzani and the headquarters of the Iraqi Communist Party, whose main base was at the foot and shadow of the mountain. Due to the strategy of the mountain, the government had been trying to take control of it since 1965.
On the other hand, the occupation of Handren meant cutting off the Soran and Badinan regions, where a specific goal of the government was the separation of Badinan from the leadership of the Kurdish revolution, whose main headquarters was in the Balakayati region.
The government took advantage of the internal disputes and divisions within the Party, which had already emerged in 1964. After their separation, they identified themselves as the Political Bureau faction of the Party and eventually established a relationship with the government, becoming armed men and supporters of the government, standing against the Kurdish revolution led by Barzani. This was another incentive for the government to try to end the revolution with higher morale and a solid plan. It was in early 1966 that they had made preparations to launch an intense and widespread attack on Kurdistan, which was set to be implemented from April 15 to 16, 1966.
It is worth noting that the architect of the plan was the Minister of Defense, Brigadier General Abdul Aziz al-Uqaili, and the military plan was named "Tawakkaltu 'ala Allah" (I rely on God). It is worth mentioning that the government was completely confident in the success of this plan and had no doubts about the outcome of the map. Even the Iraqi ambassador in Tehran, on the "D-Day" which was the day the attack began, had given a memorandum to the Iranian government, in which he requested that they not allow the remnants of the rebel forces to enter their country's territory after their defeat, and specifically requested that political asylum not be granted to Mullah Mustafa Barzani.
This implies that the government had become arrogant because of its plan, because that map had been drawn up by experts and they had arranged it with the utmost detail down to the smallest point. This attack on Mount Handren was the most extensive attack the government had carried out on the liberated areas up to that moment.
They had designed the military plan in such a way that an important role would be given to the separated Political Bureau faction, and the army would attack both Zozk and Handren mountains in the Rawanduz region, thereby cutting off the Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Kirkuk regions from the Mosul, Zakho, and Dohuk regions. At the same time, the revolutionary forces would be struck from behind by the separated Political Bureau faction and the government-affiliated aghas of the region, and they would advance towards Barzani's headquarters. Simultaneously, the Iraqi presidency and the General Staff had prepared six elite brigades within two divisions for that purpose.
That plan was worked on and April 15, 1966, was set for carrying out the extensive campaign and attack, but the plan was postponed after Abdul Salam Arif fell from his helicopter two days before the scheduled implementation of the plan on April 13, 1966. His death caused the postponement of the plan. Although the new President, Abdul Rahman Arif, who took over the rule of Iraq after his brother's death, tried to negotiate and reach an agreement, he could not overcome the senior army officers. They were insistent on implementing the planned scheme that had remained pending. As a result of the pressure, the President was persuaded to implement the plan.
The Iraqi government had prepared two military divisions to attack the Rawanduz region. The First Division consisted of brigades (1, 14, 15) and was under the command of Zaki Hussein Hilmi, and they attacked Mount Zozk. The Second Division, which was elite and had its headquarters in Kirkuk, consisted of brigades (3, 4, 5) and was under the command of Brigadier General Ibrahim Faisal al-Ansari. In early May, on the night of the 2nd to the 3rd, they launched their extensive attack with the help of a large number of Jash (pro-government militias) and the support of artillery and aircraft. The Iraqi Army advanced on each of the Korak, Akoyan Valley, Zozk, and Handren fronts. In those attacks, they were able to occupy Mount Handren. At that time, the task of defending the entire region was on the revolutionary army of Kurdistan, but Mount Handren was more in the hands of the Peshmerga of the Iraqi Communist Party, while Mount Zozk was in the hands of the Party. The forces of Khoshnaweti, the Erbil Plain, the Barzan force, and the Peshmerga of the region defended Zozk with blood after they fought a heavy battle and put up a tough defense on the mountain. The army could not occupy Zozk, due to the defense of several Peshmerga commanders, including Haji Berokhi and Aziz Khani Mahajer from the Omar Agha pass and the foot of Zozk, as well as the revolution's artillery, where both Hali Dolemari and Omar Osman supported the Peshmerga forces.
Also regarding this battle, in a letter Idris Barzani sent to Masoud Barzani on the night of May 11 to 12, 1966, he points out that one of those who played a major role in defending Mount Zozik was the force of Mam Uso Dizeyi and the commander of the Sefin Force battalion, Mustafa Haji Amin, who were able to defend firmly despite the government army's major attack. At the same time, to repel the attack, both commanders of the Erbil Plain Force battalion, namely Sergeant Osman Yusuf and Hassan Ali, as well as a force from the First Army led by Faris Kuremarki, participated and played a prominent role. In this way, it was possible to defend Mount Zozik, but without such resistance, the army was able to occupy several strategic military locations on Mount Handren. Regarding this initial victory the government achieved in Handren, Brigade Commander Saeed Hamo had said: "I will let my beard grow and will not shave it until I reach Galala."
It is worth mentioning that after Idris Barzani was authorized by Mulla Mustafa Barzani and made the general supervisor of the battle front, this is evident in several private letters exchanged by him and the Peshmerga commanders on the battle fronts, as in a letter from Izzat Sulaiman Beg Dargala addressed to Idris Barzani, the letter is dated (May 5, 1966), in which he informs him of the dire Situation of the Peshmerga and requests some necessities for him to fulfill for them, and the very next day Idris Barzani replies to him that he will fulfill all the requests he had made for them. In another letter Idris Barzani which reaches each of Rais Kamal, Lieutenant Rahman, Saeed Ahmed Agha Mergasori, Sergeant Yunis, Mam Elias, Mam Sadiq, and Izzat Sulaiman Beg, in which he asks them: "Whatever is in one's power, even if it is with blood, Handren must be recaptured, because there is no other way forward." On the other hand, due to the sudden and unexpected Situation that had arisen due to the seizure of Mount Handren, Idris Barzani appoints Fakhir Hamad Agha Mergasori as the general official of the Peshmerga force on Mount Handren and asks all commanders to be fully committed to the instructions with all capabilities.
After several meetings between the commanders of the Kurdistan Revolutionary Army, it is decided to divide the battle front in such a way that Ismat Dino Zaxoyi's platoon is for the front behind Bishuk village, the Fourth Branch of the Communist Party for the Martyrs' Cave front, a Peshmerga platoon led by Lieutenant Rahman for the Qalatga and Chaqali Mir Ibrahim front, and the final front is the Eleventh Branch of the Communist Party with the Fourth Battalion, which were supervised by Mam Sadiq and Izzat Sulaiman Beg Dargala respectively, and along with them, a group led by Salih Akoyi assisted them.
Finally, on May 11, Mulla Mustafa Barzani met with the commanders of the battle front. After being assured of victory, at four o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, it was zero hour, and Fakhir Hamad Agha Mergasori, Kamal Numan, and Numan Alwan, Known as Lieutenant Khadr, and Izzat Sulaiman Beg commanded the attack. After heavy shelling of the Iraqi Army positions, the attack began. The Peshmerga recorded a great victory, and the army's losses totaled around 400 killed and 600 wounded, along with the seizure of a large amount of weapons and ammunition. Due to the large number of army casualties, the civilian hospitals in Erbil, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah were full of corpses and wounded from the battle, and some schools were also evacuated for the purpose of housing the injured. It is worth noting that although the Peshmerga recorded a great victory, Barzani was not happy about it because of the large number who were killed in the ranks of the Iraqi Army and became victims of the Baghdad government's policy, because he did not wish for much blood to be shed, and he also believed that the solution to the Kurd issue with the Iraqi government should be through negotiation and dialogue.
The Peshmerga losses in the Battle of Handren and Zozik were the loss of life of a number of commanders and Peshmerga, including Naji Birokhi, Ahmed Haji Muhammad, Mikhail..., Sergeant Yunis Erbil (Head of Branch), Khadr Awla Beg Dargalayi (Head of Branch), and Salih Mam Elias Rawanduzi (Platoon Leader). Along with the wounding of 8 Peshmerga, they were Ali Heini Dargalayi, Mustafa Qadir Chawrash, Ismail Nasrullah Known as Mahmud Dictatorov, Hasana Shal Qarachatani, Hussein Mahmud Kaletayi, Omar Qarachatani, Saeed Abdul-Razzaq Dargalayi, and Saeed Hamad Agha Mergasori... and many others.
The recapture of the areas in the Peshmerga attack was astonishing and with the great material and human losses that the Iraqi government suffered in the Battle of Handren, which was a unique military action. Even the French writer Rene Maurice, who had lived in the heart of the battle himself, devoted a special part of his book to the day of the Peshmerga's victory and named it (Judgment Day).
After the end of the Battle of Handren, in order to allow for the burial and transfer of the bodies of the killed Iraqi Army soldiers, Barzani proposed a 24-hour ceasefire so that the International Red Cross could carry out that task. This call by Barzani reveals the true face of the Kurdistan revolution, which is that the revolution adheres to the law of war and international treaties, and this call had the most beautiful reaction in Geneva.
The victory led high-ranking army commanders to acknowledge it, for example, Abdul Aziz al-Uqaili, the former Minister of Defense in the first cabinet of Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz, when he gave a long speech during the meetings at the Republican Palace on October 21-22, 1966. Despite accusing Barzani, the Kurdish liberation movement, and the historical processes of the Kurdish revolution in several ways, he said in a part of his speech: "When we drew up the (Spring) campaign plan with the goal of advancing into the Barzan region, victory was guaranteed within three months. If the situation had continued and I had remained in charge, the advance operation toward the Barzan region would have succeeded on April 13, 1966, but the death of President Abdul Salam Arif reversed the situation. We handed over the responsibility to other people, and the army lost the Battle of Handren in a very strange and unexpected way." That shameful defeat led the former Prime Minister to announce the twelve-point declaration of June 29, 1966. In reality, the declaration was a complete surrender by the government side without the rebels being bound by it.
Although the essence of the speech comes from a defensive perspective, it is also a frank admission of the major defeat of the Iraqi Army in the words of one of the fiercest enemies of the Kurdish liberation movement and the peaceful resolution of its legitimate cause.
The Battle of Handren was one of the most important battles in which the Peshmerga forces of Kurdistan achieved a high victory during the five years of armed conflict with the various regimes of Iraq, which proved that the liberation movement of the Kurdish people had been able to impose its authority more than ever before, based on the fact that it is a military force and a factor that the government cannot ignore.
Thus, the joint defense and attack of the Communist Party and the Kurdistan Democratic Party in the Battle of Handren showed the people of Kurdistan a beautiful example of joint national struggle by Kurds and Arabs, because the forces of the Communist Party in the region were effectively utilized, and they played an active role as part of the revolutionary movement of Kurdistan, whereas previously, after the fall of the regime of Abdul Karim Qasim, their bases and headquarters were opened for them by Barzani and the Kurdish political leadership, and they were given shelter.
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2. Abdullah Ahmed Rasul Pishdari, My Memoirs, Vol: 3, Unpublished, p. 200.
3. Günter Deschner, The Kurds: A Betrayed and Oppressed People, translated by: Hama Karim Arif, Aras Institution, Erbil, 2004, pp. 209-210; Hawkar Karim Hama Sharif, The September Revolution, Salahaddin University Press, Erbil, 2012, pp. 195-198.
4. Abdul Fattah Ali Botani, Avro Newspaper, No: 51, Duhok, July 2004.
5. Renée Maurice, Kurdistan or Death, translated by: Abu Bakr Salih Ismail, Khani Press, Duhok, from the publications of the Mukriyani Institution, Erbil, 2008, p. 187.
6. Masoud Barzani, The Epic of Handren: An Unprecedented Victory, Khabat Newspaper, No: 3465, 12/5/2010.
7. Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Movement..., Volume Three, Part One, pp. 215-217; Maghdid Haji, The First Phase of the September Revolution (1961-1970), Journal of History, No: 14, Erbil, 2010, pp. 101-102.
8. Archive of the Encyclopedia Committee of Kurdistan Democratic Party.
9. Ghazi Adil Gardi, A Peshmerga in the Service of Barzani's Path... Haji Birokhi 1916 – 1975, Volume One, Turkey, 2021, p. 363.
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12. Jaafar Abbas Hamidi, The Previous Source, Part Nine, pp. 172 - 173.