During the Aylul Revolution between the years (1961-1975), several military coups took place in Iraq. A group of regimes with seemingly different ideologies but essentially with an Arab nationalist core appeared on the political stage, each holding the rule of Iraq for a period. The regime of Abd al-Karim Qasim, which abolished the monarchy in Iraq on 14 July 1958 and brought about the republican system, was overthrown by the Ba'ath Party on 8 February 1963, which ended its rule. Then, Abd al-Salam Arif and a group of generals staged a coup against the Ba'athists on 18 October 1963 and removed them from power. On 17 July 1968, the Ba'athists returned to the field once again and wrapped up the regime of Abd al-Rahman Arif, sending him and his entourage outside the country. For the second time, they took power, which was a long-term authoritarian rule in the history of Iraq.
What is worth mentioning is that all these successive regimes, when they took power, would initially listen to the Kurds and bring up dialogue and negotiations to strengthen their position and become powerful. However, after a while, when their power and authority became firm, they would restart the war against the Kurds. But what was more difficult than all their military campaigns was the year 1968, when the Ba'athists returned to power for the second time. During that period, the Kurdish internal front was subjected to fragmentation and disintegration; the old Politburo wing had for some time resorted to the government, and their forces were side-by-side with government forces in attacks and raids on the areas of the revolution. Clearly, at first, they were able to seize several cities and towns.
However, the revolution did not stand helpless against these new developments; rather, it began to reorganize and rearm the Peshmerga forces. A number of training courses were opened in Qasre, Haji Omaran, and Galala for training on the use and maintenance of weapons. In the year 1969, a large amount of weapons reached the revolution, such as Brno rifles, Katyushas, machine guns, and 106mm and 107mm mortars. Within 70 days, 38000 thousand Brno rifles were distributed to the Peshmerga forces. The preparations did not leave the revolution in a defensive situation; rather, various partisan activities were initiated, and attacks and raids were carried out in many places against the army and government institutions.
From February 1969 until the end of the year, the war and clashes continued. The Iraqi Army and the old Politburo wing continued their military campaign against the areas under the control of the revolution. The leadership of the revolution, in response to that heavy pressure, carried out a series of counter-attacks and Peshmerga campaigns in various places. One of them was The Epic of Girtk and Makhobznan when the advances of the Iraqi Army in the Pshdar region reached the heights behind the village of Girtk near Sangasar. Their map and plan were to advance from there to the plain and then to Dilman, where the headquarters of Barzani, the leader of the revolution, was located. Because this advance of the government forces was a direct threat and danger to Barzani's headquarters, Barzani's special forces, led by Commander Omar Agha Dolamari, were sent to the Valley of Martyrs. On the night of 30 to 31 October 1969, those Peshmerga forces attacked the army and mercenary gunmen who had fortified themselves around the heights of the villages of Girtk and Makhobznan. They also sent a force to the foot of the mountain to surround them and cut off any help if they came to their aid.
In the first Peshmerga attack, after a few minutes of entering the outposts, they faced each other in hand-to-hand combat, where even cold weapons like daggers were used. A small number of the government-affiliated forces survived; the rest were all killed or wounded. Nearly 150 officers, soldiers, and mercenaries (Jash) were killed in that epic. A lethal blow was dealt to the government forces. Ismail Nu'aymi, the commander of the Second Division, came to Sangasar days later to see the situation. Due to this defeat, he suffered a nervous breakdown (الانهیار العصبي) as he had never seen such a defeat before. The Iraqi Army and other forces could not dare to enter the Valley of Martyrs again. The Peshmerga did not even let them take the bodies of their dead back to Sangasar; rather, they used eleven helicopters for that purpose.
The gains of the Peshmerga forces in that battle consisted of 60 Kalashnikovs, 30 Brno rifles, one 82mm mortar, another 60mm one, 2 Degtyaryov machine guns, two wireless devices, and some military equipment. It is worth mentioning that in this epic, only 50 Peshmerga participated, who were able to completely destroy one commando company. After this battle and several other battles, the government's hope for a military solution weakened, and it resorted to dialogue and negotiations. As a result, it led to the 11 March 1970 Agreement.
Sources:1- Shawkat Mullah Ismail Hassan, Days in the History of Aylul Revolution, First Edition, Erbil, 2007.
2- Omar Osman, The Life of a Kurd, Mukryan Printing House, Second Edition, Erbil, 2008.
3- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part Two, Aylul Revolution 1961-1975, Ministry of Education Printing House, First Edition, Erbil, 2004.
4- Hawkar Karim Hama Sharif, Aylul Revolution, Salahaddin University Printing House, First Edition, Erbil, 2012.
5- Ibrahim Jalal, Southern Kurdistan and Aylul Revolution Founding and Collapse 1961- 1975, Fourth Edition, 2021.
6- Ari Karim, Several Living Pages in Aylul Revolution, Khabat Printing House, Duhok 1999.
7- Ibrahim Khalil Ahmed and Jaafar Abbas Hamidi, History of Contemporary Iraq, Mosul, 1989.